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POLICE DECEPTION OF A CRIMINAL
SUSPECT'S ATTORNEY: AN ANALYSIS OF
MORAN v. BURBINE UNDER THE
ALASKA CONSTITUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
In Moran v. Burbine, I a decision that Justice Stevens felt "tram-
pled on well-established legal principles and flouted the spirit of our
accusatorial system of justice,"'2 the United States Supreme Court up-
held a criminal suspect's waiver of his right to counsel and his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court found the
waiver valid although the police had deceived an attorney who had
been retained for the suspect by his sister.3 This deception prevented
the attorney from representing the suspect at a series of police inter-
views during which the suspect confessed to a murder.4 Not surpris-
ingly, this case has generated a substantial amount of commentary, 5
and several state courts have had to decide whether their state consti-
tutions should be interpreted in the same manner.
6
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1. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
2. Id. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. See infra note 9.
4. Moran, 475 U.S. at 417-18.
5. Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 277, 285 (1986);
Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the
English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 64 (1986); Note, Moran v.
Burbine: The Decline of Defense Counsel's "Vital" Role in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, 36 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 253 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Decline of Defense Coun-
sel's "Vital" Role]; Note, A Farewell to Miranda: Knowing and Intelligent Waiver
After Moran v. Burbine, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 111 (1986) [hereinafter Note, A
Farewell to Miranda]; Note, Criminal Procedure - Confessions - Waiver of Fifth
Amendment Rights Held Valid Although Police Failed to Inform Suspect of Attorney's
Attempts to Contact Him - Moran v. Burbine, 17 SETON HALL L. REv. 402 (1987)
[hereinafter Note, Waiver of Fifth Amendment Rights]; The Supreme Court, 1985
Term - Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 125-35 (1986) [hereinafter Leading
Cases].
6. Expressly rejecting Moran for the purpose of interpreting their state constitu-
tions are People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 610, 724 P.2d 1166, 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr.
141, 149 (1986) ("For purposes of the California Constitution, we adhere generally to
the reasoning adopted by the [Moran] dissent ...."), Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d
1088, 1089 (Fla. 1987) (per curiam) (rationale of [Moran] dissent found persuasive
and deceptive conduct by police held violative of due process clause of the Florida
Constitution), and State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, - A.2d - (1988) (due process
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The problem of police deception of a criminal suspect's attorney
has not yet arisen in Alaska. However, given the likelihood that this
issue will reach the Alaska courts and its importance to criminal pro-
cedure, this note will examine Alaska's probable reaction to the Moran
decision. This note discusses whether the conclusions of Moran will
be accepted by the Alaska courts for the purposes of articulating a
criminal suspect's right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination,
and right to due process guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution. 7
This note will first delineate the arguments presented by Brian K.
Burbine that the deception by the Rhode Island police violated his
rights under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution and then discuss the Court's subsequent rejection
of those arguments. Section II also examines Justice Stevens' dissent
and some of the reactions of courts and commentators to the decision.
Section III compares a criminal suspect's right to counsel under the
sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and under article I,
section 11, of the Alaska Constitution. This Section first presents
cases that indicate that Alaska will perhaps reject the Moran Court's
sixth amendment analysis, and then discusses a case indicating that
Alaska might in fact accept the Supreme Court's conclusion. It con-
cludes that, given present Alaska precedent, the Alaska Supreme
Court will not broaden the coverage of the article I, section 11, right
to counsel to include defendants such as Burbine. Although the courts
of Alaska have interpreted the article I, section 11, right to counsel to
extend beyond the guarantees of the sixth amendment, they have also
clause of Connecticut Constitution creates a duty to inform a suspect of timely efforts
by counsel to provide legal assistance).
In contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court followed Moran for the purpose of
interpreting its state constitution in State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195, 213, 401
N.W.2d 771, 779 (1987) ("We believe [Moran] to be a reasonable consideration of the
limit to which Miranda will be extended and that the Wisconsin Constitution does not
require greater protection."). Also indicating likely acceptance of Moran for the pur-
pose of interpreting its state constitution is People v. Behm, 154 Ill. App. 3d 987, -,
507 N.E.2d 1274, 1281 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (if faced with this issue, appellate court
would follow Moran since the court believed the Illinois Supreme Court would do so).
7. A criminal suspect's right to counsel is guaranteed by article 1, section 11, of
the Alaska Constitution. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. A criminal sus-
pect's privilege against self-incrimination is contained in article I, section 9, of the
Alaska Constitution. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. Article I, section 7, of
the Alaska Constitution contains the state's due process guarantee. See infra note 143
and accompanying text.
By virtue of the supremacy clause, the Alaska Supreme Court may not, of course,
limit the scope of Moran when determining its applicability in Alaska. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI. However, the Alaska courts may interpret the provisions of their
constitution to provide broader rights than the United States Constitution requires.




indicated an unwillingness to do this in the custodial interrogation
context, the area critical to Burbine's claim.
Section IV examines a criminal suspect's privilege against self-
incrimination under the fifth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution and article I, section 9, of the Alaska Constitution. It first dis-
cusses cases indicating that Alaska might accept the Supreme Court's
fifth amendment conclusion, and then examines cases to the contrary.
This Section concludes that due to Alaska's broader privilege, Alaska
courts will not accept the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fifth
amendment for the purpose of construing article I, section 9. Thus, a
waiver such as Burbine's would be held invalid. Section V then com-
pares a Moran-type defendant's right to due process of law under arti-
cle I, section 7, of the Alaska Constitution with his corresponding
right under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. This Section also concludes that Alaska courts will not accept
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause for the purpose of defining the scope of article I, section
7. Finally, Section VI summarizes the conclusions of this note and
highlights the probable arguments that would be advanced should a
Moran-type case be litigated in Alaska.
II. MORAN V BURBINE
In June of 1977, the Cranston, Rhode Island, police arrested
Brian K. Burbine and two companions on suspicion of burglary.
While in custody, Burbine also became a suspect in the murder of a
woman whose body had been discovered in a Providence parking lot
three months earlier. Burbine refused to execute a written waiver of
his Miranda rights," which were read to him after he became a suspect
in the Providence murder. A Cranston detective then questioned his
two companions, who further implicated him in that incident. The
detective subsequently telephoned the Providence police, who in turn
sent three officers to Cranston to question Burbine about the murder.
They arrived in Cranston about 7:00 p.m.
Upon learning that Burbine had been charged with breaking and
entering, but unaware that he was implicated in a murder case,
Burbine's sister called the Public Defender's office to obtain counsel
for him. The attorney who took this call eventually contacted Allegra
Munson, an Assistant Public Defender. The attorney told Munson
8. A criminal suspect's Miranda rights refer to the procedural safeguards re-
quired by the fifth amendment to protect a suspect's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. "Prior to any questioning, the [suspect] must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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about Burbine's arrest and his sister's request for counsel. Munson
then telephoned Cranston police headquarters at 8:15 p.m. and had
her call forwarded to the detective division. She identified herself to
the individual in the division as someone who would act as Burbine's
counsel if the police planned to question him or place him in a lineup
that evening. Responding to Munson's questions, the person in the
detectives' division acknowledged that Burbine was being held but
stated that "the police would not be questioning [him] or putting him
in a lineup and that they were through with him for the night."9 Mun-
son was not told that Burbine was under suspicion for murder and
that three Providence police officers were presently at the Cranston
station. Based on the assurances she received, Munson made no fur-
ther attempt to contact the Cranston police or Burbine that evening.
At about 9:00 p.m., six hours after Burbine was arrested, the first
of a series of question sessions regarding the murder began. '0 The po-
lice read Burbine his Miranda rights prior to each interview, and he
signed three separate waivers, each of which indicated that he wished
to proceed without the assistance of counsel. At no relevant point,
however, was Burbine informed that his sister had telephoned the
Public Defender's office, that an attorney had called the Cranston po-
lice, and that this attorney was willing to come to the station if he was
to be questioned. Burbine subsequently signed three statements ad-
mitting to the Providence murder.
9. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 414 (1986) (quoting State v. Burbine, 451
A.2d 22, 24 (R.I. 1982)). It is not clear to whom Munson spoke in the detective
division. The Rhode Island Supreme Court reported that "the trial justice found as a
fact that Ms. Munson did make the call, but further found that there was no collusion
or conspiracy on the part of the police to secrete Burbine from his attorney." State v.
Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 24 (R.I. 1982). The Moran Court declared "whether inten-
tional or inadvertent, the state of mind of the police is irrelevant to the question of the
intelligence and voluntariness of respondent's election to abandon his rights." 475
U.S. at 423. Addressing this issue, Justice Stevens stated that since the person re-
sponding to the phone call at the Cranston station acknowledged that Burbine was
indeed at the station, there was no effort to "secrete" him. Id. at 444 n.22 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). More importantly, Justice Stevens declared that there was undisputed
testimony by Lieutenant Ricard that at the time in question only he or Detective
Ferranti would have answered a call placed to the detective division. Thus, it was
"perfectly clear" that one of them knew of the call, Justice Stevens declared. Id.
Detective Ferranti later questioned Burbine with Lieutenant Ricard's full awareness
of this fact. This note accepts Justice Stevens' conclusions, and proceeds on the as-
sumption that Munson was purposefully deceived by the Cranston police.
10. It was unclear from the testimony of the officers present whether Burbine or
the police initiated the first encounter between the two after the phone call by attorney
Munson. Moran, 475 U.S. at 447-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority opinion
assumes that Burbine initiated the conversation, id. at 421-22, while Justice Stevens
notes that this conclusion is dubious in light of the lack of finding on this fact by the
state court and the uncertain testimony, id. at 447-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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After a jury convicted him of first degree murder, Burbine ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, which affirmed his con-
viction and the denial by the trial court of his motion to suppress the
statements." His petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of Rhode Island was also de-
nied.12 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit reversed that decision. 13 Relying solely on fifth amendment
grounds, the court of appeals held that the conduct of the police inval-
idated Burbine's waiver of his Miranda right to counsel. 14
John Moran, superintendent of the Rhode Island Department of
Corrections, subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. Before the Court, Burbine first argued that the failure of the
police to inform him of Munson's call and her willingness to represent
him deprived him of information necessary for him to "knowingly
waive his [f]ifth [a]mendment rights."15 In an opinion by Justice
O'Connor, the Court responded that "[e]vents outside of the presence
of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing
on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitu-
tional right." 16 The Court articulated a three-fold response to
Burbine's argument that purposeful police deception of counsel re-
tained on behalf of a suspect is so repugnant to the principles pro-
tected by Miranda that it violated his fifth amendment rights. First,
the Court noted that the purpose of the Miranda warnings is to lessen
compulsion directed toward the suspect. Thus, police treatment of an
attorney is outside the scope of the Miranda decision. 17 Second, the
Court found that "overriding practical considerations" weigh against
the adoption of a rule requiring the police to inform a suspect of an
attorney's efforts to reach him, as "the legal questions it would spawn
are legion."' 8 Finally, the Court declared that such a rule would be
only minimally beneficial to fifth amendment protections and would
significantly infringe upon society's substantial interest in obtaining
admissions of guilt. 19
Burbine's efforts to suppress the statements on sixth amendment
grounds were also rejected. The right to counsel, the Court stated,
does not attach until "after the first formal charging proceeding" or
the commencement of other adversary judicial proceedings, and the
11. State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22 (R.I. 1982).
12. Burbine v. Moran, 589 F. Supp. 1245 (D.R.I. 1984).
13. Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1985).
14. Id. at 187.
15. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
16. Id. at 422.
17. Id. at 425.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 427.
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Cranston police's deception and questioning sessions occurred prior to
that time.20 Burbine's attempt to broaden the sixth amendment's cov-
erage to protect the "integrity of the attorney-client relationship" was
rejected as inconsistent with the explicit language of the amendment,
which is concerned with "criminal prosecutions."' 21 Finally, the Court
summarily disposed of Burbine's argument that the offensive conduct
exhibited by the Cranston police department deprived him of the fun-
damental fairness guarantees of the due process clause. Although it
noted that more egregious behavior might invoke the protection of the
clause, the Court declared that "on these facts, the challenged conduct
falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the sensibility of a
civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the criminal
processes of the States."'22
In a vigorous dissent from the majority opinion, Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, focused on fifth amendment
and due process concerns. 23 Beginning with the premise that it would
be "perfectly clear Burbine's waiver was invalid" if a Cranston detec-
tive induced it through cajolery, Stevens declared that "there can be
no constitutional distinction ... between a deceptive misstatement and
the concealment by the police of the critical fact that an attorney re-
tained by the accused or his family has offered assistance, either by
telephone or in person."' 24 Similarly, the dissenters argued that the
waiver was necessarily invalid "under ordinary principles of agency
law," which would hold "the deliberate deception of Munson" to be
"tantamount to deliberate deception of her client."'25
Stevens also condemned as "profoundly misguided" the major-
ity's emphasis on the interest of society in obtaining confessions. 26
Under such a balancing test the value of any trial is merely a "proce-
dural technicality" in the case of "a murderer or a rapist caught red-
handed."' 27 Berating the Court for devoting only five sentences to its
treatment of Burbine's due process claim, Stevens disagreed with the
use of an overly simplistic "shock the conscience" test.28 Rather, Ste-
vens asserted that the proper due process standard is one of fundamen-
tal fairness, and police interference with communications between an
attorney and his client violates that standard. 29
20. Id. at 428.
21. U.S. CONST. amend VI. See Moran, 475 U.S. at 428-30.
22. Moran, 475 U.S. at 433-34.
23. Id. at 434 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 453.
25. Id. at 462.
26. Id. at 457.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 466.
29. Id. at 466-67.
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Commentators and state courts have also challenged the Moran
Court's reading of its own precedent. One commentator has con-
cluded that the Court's narrow, formalistic responses to Burbine's ar-
guments sanctioned the very behavior that Miranda sought to
prohibit.30 The author declares that the Moran Court's focus on
Burbine's state of mind in determining whether the waiver was proper
ignores Miranda's underlying concern with ensuring more satisfactory
police interrogation methods. 31 Another writer views Moran as sig-
nalling a return to the pre-Miranda concept of a "voluntariness" test
for determining the admissibility of a suspect's confession.32 This test,
which inquired as to whether a confession was the product of the sus-
pect's free will and unconstrained choice, was criticized by commenta-
tors for failing to offer any guidance to police officers and permitting
manipulative interrogation techniques. 33
In interpreting the California Constitution, the Supreme Court of
California was similarly unpersuaded by the approach of the Moran
majority. Justice Grodin held that "whether or not a suspect in cus-
tody has previously waived his rights to silence and counsel, the police
may not deny him the opportunity, before questioning begins or re-
sumes, to meet with his retained or appointed counsel who has taken
diligent steps to come to his aid."'34
III. ANALYSIS OF MORAN v BURBINE UNDER THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL PROVISION OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION
This Section first examines cases that interpret the Alaska Consti-
tution's right to counsel to supply broader guarantees than those pro-
vided by the sixth amendment. By broadly interpreting their right to
counsel, these cases suggest that Alaska might reject the sixth amend-
ment analysis of the Moran Court. This Section ultimately concludes,
however, that due to Alaska's refusal to expand the reach of article I,
section 11, to the custodial interrogation context, the Alaska Supreme
Court will likely not rely on this provision to suppress the statements
of a Moran-type defendant.
A. Case Law Indicating that Alaska Will Likely Reject the Moran
Court's Sixth Amendment Conclusion
Article I, section 11, of the Alaska Constitution mirrors the lan-
guage of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution in its
30. See Leading Cases, supra note 5, at 131-32.
31. Id. at 132.
32. See Note, Farewell to Miranda, supra note 5, at 115-22, 143.
33. Id. at 115-22.




guarantee of the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions. In relevant
part, the Alaska provision states that: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have the right ... to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense."' 35 In construing the guarantees of article I, section 11,
the Alaska Supreme Court has repeatedly voiced its independence
from the minimal federal standards of the sixth amendment. Several
cases indicate that Alaska has consistently defined its right to counsel
provision to supply broader rights to criminal defendants than the
Supreme Court has interpreted the sixth amendment to provide.
Although no one case directly addresses the issue of police deception
of a suspect's attorney, collectively the cases indicate a willingness by
Alaska courts to provide a more expansive right to counsel than the
federal right in order to safeguard the accused from prejudicial
procedures.
In Baker v. City of Fairbanks,3 6 the Alaska Supreme Court de-
fined the term "criminal prosecution" as it relates to the "right to a
speedy and public trial by jury" in article I, section 11, to include any
"offense a direct penalty for which may be incarceration in a jail or
penal institution. ' 37 Also within the scope of this term are "any of-
fenses which may result in the loss of a valuable license," and "offenses
which, even if incarceration is not a possible punishment, still connote
criminal conduct in the traditional sense of the term."' 38 The court
acknowledged that it was clearly interpreting Alaska's right to a jury
trial to extend beyond the corresponding sixth amendment guarantee.
The court declared that:
While we must enforce the minimum constitutional standards im-
posed upon us by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are free, and we are under a
duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and privileges to be
within the intention and spirit of our local constitutional language
and to be necessary for the kind of civilized life and ordered liberty
which is at the core of our constitutional heritage. We need not
stand by idly and impassively, waiting for constitutional direction
from the highest court of the land. Instead, we should be moving
concurrently to develop and expound the principles embedded in
our constitutional law.39
In Alexander v. City of Anchorage,40 the scope of the term "crimi-
nal prosecution" as it relates to the right of an indigent under the
35. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11. Similarly, the sixth amendment provides in rele-
vant part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
37. Id. at 402.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 401-02.
40. 490 P.2d 910 (Alaska 1971).
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Alaska Constitution "to have assistance of counsel" was at issue.41
Quoting the above language from Baker, the Alaska Supreme Court
went on to define the term in this situation as broadly as it was con-
strued in Baker, despite a more narrow interpretation of the sixth
amendment by the United States Supreme Court.42
While neither case addresses the issue of police deception, both
Baker and Alexander are nonetheless relevant to the question of
whether Moran will be followed in Alaska. These two cases provide
evidence that the Alaska Supreme Court is willing to exert its author-
ity and interpret the Alaska Constitution to provide broader rights to
criminal suspects than those provided by the United States
Constitution.
In both Baker and Alexander, the Alaska Supreme Court cited its
earlier decision of Roberts v. State.43 In that case, Gordon Roberts
was indicted on forgery charges and furnished with court-appointed
counsel. In an interview with a United States Secret Service agent and
a Fairbanks detective, Roberts was pressured into supplying handwrit-
ing samples with threats of a court order and possible contempt of
court proceedings. This interview was held without the presence or
consent of Roberts' attorney, although the defendant had requested
that his counsel be present. The court held that Roberts' article I,
section 11, right to counsel was violated, despite the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in Gilbert v. California.44 Gilbert held
that a pre-indictment gathering of handwriting samples was not a
"critical stage" of the prosecution.45 Thus, the Court concluded that
the defendant could assert no sixth'amendment right to counsel. In
Roberts, however, the Alaska Supreme Court proclaimed that "[w]e
are not bound in expounding the Alaska Constitution's Declaration of
41. Id. at 913.
42. Id. at 914-15.
This definition of "criminal prosecution" as it relates to the article I, section 11,
right to counsel remains far more generous than an indigent's corresponding sixth
amendment right. In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Supreme Court held
that "no indigent criminal defendant can be sentenced to a term of imprisonment un-
less the state has afforded him the right to assistance of counsel in his defense." Id. at
373-74 (emphasis added). Thus, an indigent defendant apparently has no guaranteed
sixth amendment right to counsel even in prosecutions where he faces a prison term:
if the defendant is only fined, the sixth amendment is not implicated.
43. 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969).
44. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
45. Id. at 267. The companion case to Gilbert, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967), declared that an accused's sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at
any "critical" stage of the criminal proceeding. Id. at 224-25. Any stage of the prose-
cution "where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial" is a critical stage. Id. at 226.
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Rights by decisions of the United States Supreme Court, past or fu-
ture, which expound identical or closely similar provisions of the
United States Constitution. '46 This case again demonstrates the will-
ingness of the Alaska Supreme Court to diverge from federal prece-
dent to create new rights for criminal suspects.
In Kirby v. Illinois,47 a plurality of the United States Supreme
Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not apply
to pre-trial identification procedures instituted before the initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings such as indictment or arraignment. 48
Again, the Alaska Supreme Court was not persuaded by the Supreme
Court's conclusion. In Blue v. State,49 the Alaska Supreme Court de-
clared that the result in Kirby provided inadequate protection for
criminal defendants. The defendant in Blue was identified in a lineup
held at a nightclub only three hours after an alleged robbery; the po-
lice read him his Miranda rights but had not charged or even formally
arrested him. The Alaska Supreme Court reiterated that it was not
"limited by decisions of the United States Supreme Court or by the
United States Constitution when interpreting its state constitution. '50
The court concluded that "a suspect who is in custody is entitled to
46. 458 P.2d at 342. The court also stated that it was important to note that since
the taking of Gilbert's handwriting examples occurred before indictment and the ap-
pointment of counsel, the Gilbert case was clearly distinguishable on its facts. Id. at
343.
It is also worth noting that both Roberts and Baker explicitly overruled language
in Knusden v. City of Anchorage, 358 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1960), that sought to bind
Alaska courts to Supreme Court interpretations of the sixth amendment. This case, if
it were still valid law, would have immediately foreclosed any broadening of article I,
section 11, to protect defendants such as Burbine. In delineating the scope of Alaska's
right to trial by jury, the court in Knusden held that "it was not the intent of the
Alaska Constitutional Convention, in adopting a portion of the wording of the [s]ixth
[a]mendment, to give article I, section 11 any broader application than that portion of
the [s]ixth [a]mendment had been given by the United States Supreme Court." Id. at
379. In overruling this passage, the court in Roberts stated: "Such a holding in Knus-
den is inconsistent with the constitutional grant of judicial power to this court." 458
P.2d at 342. In Baker, the court also dismissed as erroneous the conclusion set forth
in Knusden that proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention mandated such
a proposition. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 398 (Alaska 1970).
47. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
48. Id. at 689-90. The Supreme Court in Kirby refused to extend the exclusionary
rule of the companion cases of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and
United States v. Gilbert, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). The Wade-Gilbert rule holds inadmissi-
ble in-court identifications resulting from a post-indictment pre-trial lineup held with-
out notice to and in the absence of the accused's counsel. Wade, 388 U.S. at 240.
49. 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977).
50. Id. at 641.
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have counsel present at a pre-indictment lineup unless exigent circum-
stances exist so that providing counsel would unduly interfere with a
prompt and purposeful investigation. '51
This case represents a clear divergence from federal precedent on
the scope of an accused's right to counsel. While the United States
Supreme Court determined that the sixth amendment should not be
broadened to apply to a pre-indictment identification procedure, a
unanimous Alaska Supreme Court was willing to expand the scope of
article I, section 11, to cover such a procedure in order to protect the
suspect from possible prejudice and honor his rights to counsel, due
process, and confrontation of witnesses. A Moran-type defendant in
Alaska could thus utilize Blue to argue that even though the deception
occurred before he was indicted or formally charged with a crime, that
fact does not prevent the article I, section 11, right to counsel from
attaching. Such a defendant could then argue that in order to protect
himself from "prejudicial procedures"52 the court should find such de-
ceptive police behavior to be violative of his right to counsel under the
Alaska Constitution.
A case distinguishing Blue and Roberts, however, and refusing to
invoke article I, section 11, is Loveless v. State.53 Confronting the
Alaska Supreme Court in Loveless was the question of whether an ac-
cused had a right to counsel during a jailhouse psychiatric examina-
tion motivated primarily by the concern that the accused was suicidal.
The Loveless court held admissible the doctor's testimony that the de-
fendant appeared mentally unimpaired during the interview, which
was held before the defendant had secured counsel. David Loveless
was being prosecuted for first degree murder and had raised an intoxi-
cation defense. Loveless argued that conducting the examination
without affording him "the opportunity to have an attorney present
violated his constitutional right to counsel."'54
The Alaska Supreme Court responded that Kirby v. Illinois pre-
cluded his sixth amendment right from attaching at this stage, but that
reliance on article I, section 11, was not thereby foreclosed. Neverthe-
less, Justice Matthews distinguished Blue and Roberts as extensions of
Alaska's right to counsel to protect the accused during "proceedings
51. Id. at 642. The court ultimately decided that this case presented such exigent
circumstances, however, since creating a right to counsel on these facts would have
delayed the identification procedure until the following day, when the victim's mem-
ory would not be as fresh as it was only three hours after the incident. Id.; see also
Benefield v. State, 559 P.2d 91 (Alaska 1977). Benefield, a codefendant of Clifton
Blue, argued that his article I, section 11, right to counsel was violated by the same
lineup. The court dismissed his claim on the basis of the same exigencies. Id. at 94.
52. Blue, 558 P.2d at 641 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1971)).
53. 592 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1979).
54. Id. at 1210.
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that are investigatory in nature and which are conducted in an adver-
sary context."155 The court concluded that this rationale does not ap-
ply to pre-indictment physical or psychological examinations
primarily concerned with the health of the prisoner and where there
was no evidence of an investigatory purpose.5 6 This case would not,
however, hinder an Alaska court from broadening article I, section 11,
to cover a Moran-type situation, as Burbine's period of detention in
the Cranston police station involved proceedings that were both inves-
tigatory and conducted in an adversarial context.57
In Houston v. State,5 8 the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel
at a mid-trial psychiatric examination. The examination was con-
ducted on behalf of the prosecution pursuant to court order. The
court noted that a majority of federal and state cases hold that a de-
fendant at such an examination does not have a right to counsel.59
However, the court determined that certain precedent of other state
courts maintaining that a defendant does have a right to counsel at
such proceedings was closer to the "spirit and actual rulings" of the
Roberts and Blue decisions.60 The Houston court concluded that "the
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. After being apprehended on a burglary charge, Burbine spent approximately
four and one-half hours alone in an interrogation room while the Cranston police
obtained statements from Burbine's two companions that implicated him in the
Hickey homicide. During this period the Cranston police also summoned the Provi-
dence police and lied to an attorney seeking to come to the Cranston station to repre-
sent Burbine if necessary. 475 U.S. at 446 (Stevens, J., dissenting). At 11:20 p.m.,
three hours after the public defender was told they were "through" with Burbine, the
Providence and Cranston officers were still questioning him. Id. at 449. Thus, the
conclusion in Loveless that the examinations were not conducted for investigatory pur-
poses or in an adversary context would not apply to a Moran-type case.
Another case that distinguishes Blue, but would not hinder a Moran-type defend-
ant in Alaska, is Anchorage v. Geber, 592 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1979). The Geber court
held that a suspect does not have the right to be advised that she has the right to have
counsel present before being required by police to perform field sobriety tests. Id. at
1192. The passage of a few hours would materially alter the suspect's degree of im-
pairment, the court stated, and this passage of time is not as critical in the lineup
context present in Blue. Id. This need for urgency is not present in the custodial
interrogation context either; thus, the state could not rely on this case to limit the
application of article I, section 11, in a Moran-type case.
58. 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979).
59. Id. at 792.
60. Id. at 795. The court in Houston looked to New York and Oregon case law.
In Lee v. County Court, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 439-40, 267 N.E.2d 452, 456, 318 N.Y.S.2d
705, 711, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971), the New York Court of Appeals held that
pre-trial psychiatric examinations were a critical stage of the proceedings. The de-
fendant thus had a right to counsel at such an examination. The Houston court also
cited Shepard v. Bowe, 250 Or. 288, 442 P.2d 238 (1968), and State v. Corbin, 15 Or.
App. 536, 516 P.2d 1314 (1973). Houston, 602 P.2d at 794 n.19. Both cases addressed
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guarantee of effective assistance of counsel afforded by Alaska's consti-
tution required the presence of [defendant's] attorney throughout the
psychiatric interview. ' 61 Once again, this case demonstrates the will-
ingness of the Alaska Supreme Court to interpret expansively its right
to counsel provision to safeguard the rights of a defendant, despite a
narrower federal rule. This willingness to define broadly article I, sec-
tion 11, indicates that the Moran Court's application of the sixth
amendment may not be followed in Alaska.
More recently, in the 1985 decision of Resek v. State,62 the Alaska
Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[t]he right to counsel under the
Alaska Constitution is more expansive than the corresponding right
under the [s]ixth [a]mendment to the United States Constitution. '63
Despite the United States Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Illi-
nois64 that the only burden the sixth amendment imposes on state
courts is that "no indigent criminal defendant can be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment" without being afforded the right to counsel,65
the Alaska Supreme Court stood by its significantly broader right to
appointed counsel articulated in Alexander v. City of Anchorage.66
the right to counsel at a psychiatric interview in the context of protecting a suspect's
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Each court held that the defend-
ant had a right to counsel in order fully to protect his privilege. See Shepard, 250 Or.
at 293, 442 P.2d at 240; Corbin, 15 Or. App. at 544, 516 P.2d at 1318.
Although not relevant to the Houston case, it is also worth mentioning that Ore-
gon invalidated a suspect's waiver on facts very similar to the Moran scenario. State v.
Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 602 P.2d 272 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980). In
Haynes, after an attorney who had been retained for Charles Haynes by his wife
learned the whereabouts of the defendant, the attorney called the station and an-
nounced that he was coming to provide Haynes with counsel. Before the attorney
arrived, however, the police took Haynes from the station, allegedly to search for the
murder victim's remains. The police never informed Haynes that an attorney retained
on his behalf was attempting to contact him. Id. at 65, 602 P.2d at 274. Although
Haynes was read his Miranda rights upon his arrest, the Oregon Supreme Court held
that when the police do not inform a suspect that retained counsel is seeking to con-
sult with him, any prior waiver is invalid as not being given knowingly and intelli-
gently. Id. at 72, 602 P.2d at 278. The Haynes Court elaborated that "[t]o pass up an
abstract offer to call some unknown lawyer is very different from refusing to talk with
an identified attorney actually available to provide at least initial assistance and ad-
vice, whatever might be arranged in the long run. A suspect indifferent to the first
offer may well react quite differently to the second." Id.
61. 602 P.2d at 795.
62. 706 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1985).
63. Id. at 291 n.1l:
64. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
65. Id. at 373.
66. 490 P.2d 910, 913-16 (Alaska 1971). See also supra note 42. The Alaska
Supreme Court ultimately decided in Resek, however, that an in rem forfeiture pro-
ceeding regarding property used in connection with a violation of Alaska drug laws
was not a "criminal prosecution" within article I, section 11. 706 P.2d at 293.
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As the above cases indicate, the Alaska Supreme Court clearly
has extended the right to counsel provided by article I, section 11, of
the Alaska Constitution beyond the guarantees of the sixth amend-
ment. In contrast to what one commentator deemed to be an overly
"formalistic" analysis and "out of hand rejection" of Burbine's sixth
amendment argument in Moran,67 the Alaska Supreme Court thor-
oughly considers the concerns of a defendant when examining his arti-
cle I, section 11, rights.68 Especially important for a suspect seeking to
block the admission of confessions such as Burbine's is Blue v. State.
Blue demonstrates that the Alaska Supreme Court is willing to invoke
the right to counsel in the pre-indictment stage of the prosecution,
when the sixth amendment is inapplicable. This is the stage at which
the police lied to Burbine's lawyer and succeeded in eliciting his con-
fession. Thus, Blue provides strong authority for an Alaska court to
reject Moran and suppress confessions such as Burbine's under the
right to counsel provisions of the Alaska Constitution. Blue, taken
with the other cases discussed above, demonstrates that the Alaska
Supreme Court may perhaps disregard the minimum standards of the
sixth amendment to safeguard criminal defendants from prejudicial
interrogation.
B. Case Law Indicating That Alaska Will Likely Accept the
Moran Court's Sixth Amendment Conclusion
Although the above cases indicate a willingness on the part of the
Alaska Supreme Court to depart from federal articulation of the guar-
antees of the sixth amendment, the court has also expressly refused to
extend the article I, section 11, right to counsel to custodial interroga-
tions. It was in this context that Burbine alleged his right to counsel
67. See Leading Cases, supra note 5, at 100, 132.
68. See, e.g., Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 795 (Alaska 1979) (After discussing
Roberts and Blue, the court noted that the mid-trial psychiatric interview potentially
prejudiced the defendant because had counsel been present he might have noticed
improprieties that the defendant would not have. Thus effective cross-examination of
the examining doctor would thereby have been enhanced by counsel's presence.); Blue
v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 641 (Alaska 1977) ("The interests of a suspect in having coun-
sel present involve the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel, the right to due
process during the lineup procedures and the right to confront witnesses which insures
effective cross-examination."); Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 343 (Alaska 1969)("The prejudice to appellant" that arose in obtaining the handwriting samples without
the appointment or presence of counsel includes the fact that Roberts' attorney
"might have noticed improprieties of which this court is not aware, because the ac-
cused, a layman[,] probably frightened by the investigation, may have failed to per-




had been violated.69 Burbine was in police custody at the Cranston
station with the Providence officers questioning the other burglary sus-
pects about his involvement in the Hickey homicide when the public
defender was falsely informed that Burbine would not be questioned
that evening. The refusal to extend Alaska's right to counsel provision
to custodial interrogations indicates that however objectionable it finds
the Moran result to be, the Alaska Supreme Court will likely not look
to article I, section 11, to invalidate a waiver such as Burbine's.
The case refusing to extend article I, section 11, to custodial inter-
rogations, Eben v. State,70 held that neither defendant Vincent Eben's
federal nor state right to counsel had attached when he made a phone
call to a friend while in custody and was overheard making allegedly
self-incriminating statements.71 Eben was arrested at his parents'
apartment shortly after stabbing them to death. While handcuffing
Eben, an Officer Haakenson attempted to read the suspect his Mi-
randa rights, but before the officer could finish Eben stated that he was
aware of his rights. After arriving at the police station at 5:30 a.m.,
Eben was taken to an interview room where Haakenson fully advised
him of his rights. Eben replied he understood each of them, but he
refused to sign the Miranda rights waiver form. Finally, Eben told the
officers that he would sign the waiver after he talked with a friend.
Eben at no time indicated that he was willing to make a statement
or answer any questions; however, the officers remained in the inter-
view room while Eben spoke with his friend over the telephone. After
69. In Eben v. State, 599 P.2d 700, 707 n.18 (Alaska 1979), in which the court
refused to extend article I, section 11, to the "custodial interrogation context," the
alleged deprivation of the defendant's right to counsel took place after he was arrested
but before the commencement of any adversarial judicial proceedings. It was in this
same context that the alleged violation of Burbine's right to counsel took place.
Burbine had been arrested, but not formally charged with any crime. Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986).
70. 599 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1979). In Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska
1983), the Alaska Supreme Court disavowed a portion of the Eben case addressing an
issue of statutory construction. Id. at 1210-11. Copelin, however, had no effect on the
portion of Eben dealing with the applicability of article I, section 11, to the custodial
interrogation context, the point for which it is discussed in this note.
At issue in Copelin were ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150(b) and its parallel provision,
Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(b). The statute provides:
Immediately after an arrest, a prisoner shall have the right to telephone or
otherwise communicate with [his] attorney and any relative or friend, and
any attorney at law entitled to practice in the courts of Alaska shall, at the
request of the prisoner or any relative or friends of the prisoner, have the
right to immediately visit the person arrested.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150(b) (1984). The court held that both provisions mandate
that an individual arrested for driving while intoxicated who asks to consult a lawyer
must be given the opportunity to do so before being required to decide whether to take
a breathalyzer test. Copelin, 659 P.2d at 1215.
71. Eben, 599 P.2d at 707.
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the phone call, he refused to sign the waiver. At a pre-trial hearing,
Eben's motion for a protective order prohibiting the officers who heard
the call from testifying as to potential admissions by the defendant was
denied. Eben argued that permitting the officers to testify regarding
the contents of the call violated his sixth amendment and article I,
section 11, right to counsel. Quoting from Kirby v. Illinois, the Alaska
Supreme Court dismissed Eben's sixth amendment claim, because no
"adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraign-
ment-had been initiated against him.' '72
Although Eben argued that the officers' testimony violated his
sixth amendment right to counsel, the court stressed that his claim
was more properly brought under the fifth amendment.73 In a foot-
note, the court similarly dismissed defendant's article I, section 11,
argument: "We find no convincing reasons for extending the right to
counsel guaranteed in article I, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution
to the factual context presented here. The Miranda protections are
specifically tailored to the custodial interrogation context."' 74 Quoting
from a California Supreme Court case, the court concluded that there
were also "compelling policy considerations" against extending
Alaska's right to counsel to include this case, such as unduly hamper-
ing police investigations. 75
Just as was the case in Eben, the alleged violations of Burbine's
right to counsel took place after his arrest and while he was in police
custody, but "before the initiation of adversary judicial proceed-
ings."' 76 The same rationale articulated by Chief Justice Rabinowitz in
Eben to preclude the extension of article I, section 11, to the "custo-
dial interrogation context" would also seem to preclude a violation of
72. Id. at 706 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
73. Id. at 705-07.
74. Id. at 707 n.18.
75. Id. (quoting People v. Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 178, 187, 555 P.2d 297, 301, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 511, 515 (1976)). California, however, has since decided that curtailing the type
of police deception exhibited in Moran is an acceptable hindrance on police investiga-
tions. The California Supreme Court rejected Moran for the purposes of interpreting
the California Constitution. People v. Houston, 2 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230
Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986). See supra note 6.
Also, the court in Eben was not deterred by the Alaska Supreme Court's expan-
sive holding in Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977), which was cited as a com-
parison case after People v. Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 178, 555 P.2d 297, 133 Cal. Rptr. 511
(1976), and a Maine case, State v. Stone, 397 A.2d 989, 996-97 (Me. 1979), which was
also concerned with the scope of a defendant's right to counsel. Eben, 599 P.2d at 707
n.18.
76. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986) (quoting United States v.
Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192 (1984)).
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a Moran-type defendant's right to counsel under the Alaska
Constitution. 77
In Moran, Burbine sought to salvage his sixth amendment claim
by arguing that the right to counsel should be broadened to include a
"right to non-interference with an attorney's dealings with a criminal
suspect .... -78 This right would accrue "[from] the moment the rela-
tionship is formed, or, at the very least, once the defendant is placed in
custodial interrogation. '79 The Court rejected this contention as both
"practically and theoretically unsound." 80 The Court felt it was prac-
tically unsound because this sixth amendment right should not attach
at "different times depending on the fortuity" of when counsel is re-
tained; it was theoretically unsound because the express language of
the amendment limits its applicability to "criminal prosecutions. 81
Thus, the government's role must shift from investigation to accusa-
tion to trigger the amendment. 82
77. See Eben, 599 P.2d at 707 n.18. Other cases narrowly construing Alaska's
right to counsel are Merrill v. State, 423 P.2d 686 (Alaska), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 1040
(1967), and Svedlund v. Municipality of Anchorage, 671 P.2d 378 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983). In Merrill, a preliminary hearing at which witnesses identified the defendants
was held before counsel was appointed for them. The defendants argued that this
procedure violated their sixth amendment and article I, section 11, rights to counsel.
Noting that under federal law the sixth amendment attaches only at preliminary hear-
ings that constitute a "critical stage" of the proceeding, the court adopted this ap-
proach for Alaska's constitution. Merrill, 423 P.2d at 690. The court held that the
above hearing was not a critical stage, as the defendants could not be called upon to
plead and in fact had made no statement. Id. at 691.
In Svedlund, the court concluded that "the breathalyzer exam is not a 'critical
stage' at which the constitution requires counsel's presence." 671 P.2d at 382.
Although the court cited Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977), it is not clear
whether it was construing article I, section 11, the sixth amendment, or both. Regard-
less, the court held that a suspect has no right to contact an attorney prior to deciding
whether to submit to a breathalyzer test. Both cases thus represent instances in which
the courts of Alaska did not expand the article I, section 11, right to counsel to protect
a suspect from possible prejudice. The cases therefore indicate that Alaska courts
might accept the Moran Court's sixth amendment analysis.
78. 475 U.S. at 429.
79. Id.
80. Id. The Court also dismissed Burbine's argument as a matter of precedent.
Burbine supported his "right to non-interference" by raising a Miranda footnote
which states: "The police also prevented the attorney from consulting with his client.
Independent of any other constitutional proscription, this action constitutes a viola-
tion of the [s]ixth [a]mendment right to the assistance of counsel and excludes any
statement obtained in its wake." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465-66 n.35
(1966). Justice O'Connor, however, proclaimed that subsequent decisions precluded
the reliance on Miranda for articulating any sixth amendment right to counsel attach-
ing prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. Moran, 475 U.S. at 429-
30.
81. Id. at 430.
82. Id.
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The Court also faulted Burbine for relying on precedent that has
come to be viewed as articulating the fifth and not sixth amendment
right to counsel.8 3 The latter right to counsel is explicitly guaranteed
by the sixth amendment, which declares that the accused has the right
to the assistance of counsel for his defense in all criminal prosecutions.
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as inter-
preted in Miranda, also provides for a right to counsel in the custodial
interrogation context in order to protect fully this privilege. Chief Jus-
tice Rabinowitz similarly faulted Eben for relying on fifth amendment
precedent when claiming a violation of his sixth amendment rights,
and he stated that Alaska cases have recognized this distinction.8 4
Thus, by refusing to extend article I, section 11, into the custodial
interrogation context, Eben implicitly rejects Burbine's argument that
the sixth amendment should be extended.
Although Alaska has broadened its right to counsel to extend be-
yond the reaches of the sixth amendment, none of these extensions of
article I, section 11, were in the context of police deception of a de-
tained suspect's attorney. In Baker v. City of Fairbanks and Alexander
v. City of Anchorage, the Alaska Supreme Court defined "criminal
prosecution" in article I, section 11, more broadly than the United
States Supreme Court has defined that term in the sixth amendment
context,8 5 but that broader definition would not directly assist a de-
fendant such as Burbine. Alaska's definition of "criminal prosecu-
tion" as presented by Baker and Alexander enlarged an individual's
right to a jury trial and an indigent's right to appointed counsel, 86 but
does not call for an earlier attachment of the latter right in a criminal
proceeding. Blue, on the other hand, clearly does call for earlier at-
tachment of the right to counsel, and the concern for protecting the
accused in an adversary context expressed in that case and Roberts
probably would apply to a defendant such as Burbine. However, in
accordance with federal precedent, the Eben opinion declares that it is
the privilege against self-incrimination that should be invoked to pro-
tect the accused during the custodial interrogation context. 87 It thus
appears that if a case similar to Moran v. Burbine were to arise in
Alaska, article I, section 11, could not be relied upon by the defendant
to suppress his confession.
83. Id. at 429-30.
84. Eben v. State, 599 P.2d 700, 707 n.18 (Alaska 1979).
85. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
86. Id.
87. 599 P.2d at 707.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF MORAN . BURBINE UNDER THE
ALASKA CONSTITUTION'S PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
After examining cases that interpret restrictively the scope of the
Miranda guarantees and a case that permits police deception of a sus-
pect, this Section first recognizes that Alaska courts might accept the
Moran Court's fifth amendment analysis. However, after more thor-
oughly examining the Alaska court's construction of the article I, sec-
tion 9, privilege against self-incrimination, this Section ultimately
concludes that due to an expansive interpretation of the privilege, the
Alaska courts will likely reject the Moran Court's fifth amendment
conclusion.
A. Case Law Indicating That Alaska Will Likely Accept the
Moran Court's Fifth Amendment Conclusion
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in relevant part, that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."'8 8 Similarly, the second clause of
article I, section 9, of the Alaska Constitution provides: "No person
shall be compelled in any criminal proceeding to be a witness against
himself."' 89 Although Alaska courts have repeatedly confronted the
issue of whether a suspect has properly waived his Miranda rights,
their treatment of this issue has been balanced and has not demon-
strated a clear predilection either to uphold or strike down a suspect's
alleged waiver.90 In accordance with federal precedent, the Alaska
Supreme Court has stated that to uphold a suspect's waiver of his Mi-
randa rights the state must carry a heavy burden in demonstrating
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9. Use of the word "proceeding" in the Alaska
provision, potentially a broader term than "case," has not been construed more
broadly by the courts.
90. See, e.g., Hampton v. State, 569 P.2d 138, 144 (Alaska 1977) (although ac-
knowledging that a suspect could be intoxicated enough to be incapable of properly
waiving his Miranda rights, the court held that a close examination of the record
indicates an adequate evidentiary basis to uphold the lower court's conclusion that the
defendant possessed the requisite mental capacity); Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173,
1182 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (in which defendant made an ambiguous request for
counsel, and trooper, instead of inquiring into defendant's intention, attempted to
elicit a statement from defendant, the court held that the state did not meet its
"'heavy burden' of showing that Hampel made a knowing and intelligent waiver of
his right to have counsel present during questioning"); Williamson v. State, 692 P.2d
965, 968 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (in which defendant suggested "he might need an
attorney" while turning himself in for murder, but after being read his Miranda rights,
signed a written waiver, the court determined "given the totality of the circumstances,
Williamson knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.").
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that such waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligently given by
examining the totality of the circumstances. 91
Addressing Burbine's fifth amendment claim, the Supreme Court
stated that the voluntariness of Burbine's waiver was not at issue and
that the facts demonstrated he acted knowingly and intelligently. 92
The Court declared that once it is determined that a suspect under-
stood his rights and the state's intention of using his statements to gain
a conviction, the waiver is conclusively valid as a matter of law as long
as the suspect's decision to forego his rights was uncoerced.93 Justice
O'Connor dismissed the belief of the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit that the conduct of the Cranston police invali-
dated the waiver by highlighting the fact that "[e]vents occurring
outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him
surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and know-
ingly relinquish a constitutional right."' 94 As discussed earlier in this
note, the Moran Court, by narrowly reading Miranda and focusing on
practical concerns and society's interest in obtaining confessions, 95 re-
jected Burbine's argument that sanctioning behavior like that exhib-
ited by the Cranston police was repugnant to fifth amendment values.
Several Alaska cases indicate possible agreement with the
Supreme Court's disposal of Burbine's arguments. In Nicholi v.
State,96 decided only three years after Miranda, the Alaska Supreme
Court upheld the admissibility of incriminating statements made by
the suspect at a coroner's inquest and police interview. In reaching
this decision, the Alaska Supreme Court quoted a two page excerpt
from State v. McKnight,97 a New Jersey Supreme Court case that simi-
larly upheld the admissibility of statements made by a defendant.
In both cases the defendants argued that they did not fully com-
prehend their rights. The New Jersey Supreme Court offered an ex-
ceedingly narrow interpretation of Miranda. In the part of the
opinion quoted in Nicholi, the New Jersey court wrote that it would be
"thoughtless" to transfer the same right to counsel that exists at the
trial stage "to the detectional scene," as that would thwart the state's
effort to convict the guilty.98 "It is consonant with good morals, and
the Constitution, to exploit a criminal's ignorance or stupidity in the
91. Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1160-61 (Alaska 1985); Hampton v. State,
569 P.2d 138, 141 n.6 (Alaska 1977).
92. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421-24 (1986).
93. Id. at 422-23.
94. Id. at 422.
95. Id. at 424-28. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
96. 451 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1969).
97. 52 N.J. 35, 52-55, 243 A.2d 240, 250-52 (1968).
98. Id. at 52-53, 243 A.2d at 250.
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detectional process," stated the court.99 This focus on the benefits of
granting the state broad investigatory powers without stressing the
need to afford criminal suspects a broad right to procedural fairness
strongly resembles the Supreme Court's concern in Moran not to in-
fringe upon society's "legitimate and substantial interest in securing
admissions of guilt."100
The New Jersey court also declared that the focus of Miranda,
"was upon the right not to be 'compelled' to incriminate one's self and
upon nothing else."' 1 In dismissing Burbine's claim that the Cran-
ston police's behavior was so inimical to the values Miranda sought to
protect that it violated his fifth amendment rights, Justice O'Connor
similarly stated that "[t]he purpose of the Miranda warnings ... is to
dissipate the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation ....
The Nicholi court also appears to agree with the Moran Court's belief
that once it is shown the suspect's waiver was voluntary and that he
understood his rights, the waiver analysis is concluded. Quoted from
McKnight is the statement that if these waiver criteria are met, the fact
that the defendant "could well have used a lawyer" is irrelevant. 10 3
Although the facts of the Nicholi case did not involve any police de-
ception, the Alaska Supreme Court expressed agreement with a view
of Miranda that resembles the Moran Court's restrictive interpretation
of that case.
In Sovalik v. State, 104 the Alaska Supreme Court also demon-
strated a possible willingness to accept Moran, as it upheld the admis-
sibility of a suspect's statements despite purposeful police deception of
that suspect. In the course of a murder investigation Alaska police
officers interviewed thirty persons.105 Because these interviews proved
fruitless, a second round of interrogation was scheduled, beginning
with those living closest to the area where the bodies were discov-
ered. 106 During the course of questioning suspect Thomas Sovalik,
one officer took a sample fingerprint from a bulletin board and fraudu-
lently told him that it was taken from one of the victim's water bottles
and that it belonged to the suspect.107 Sovalik responded that all he
99. Id. at 53, 243 A.2d at 250-51.
100. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 427 (1986).
101. McKnight, 52 N.J. at 54, 243 A.2d at 250.
102. Moran, 475 U.S. at 425.
103. Nicholi v. State, 451 P.2d 351, 356 (Alaska 1969) (quoting McKnight, 52 N.J.
at 55, 243 A.2d at 251).
104. 612 P.2d 1003 (Alaska 1980).
105. Id. at 1004.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1005.
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took from the campsite where the bodies were found was a
flashlight.10 8
This admission led to a search of Sovalik's residence and ulti-
mately his being charged with murder. The Alaska Supreme Court
held that such deception was not coercive and did not tend to produce
an untruthful confession and thus could not block the admission into
evidence of his statements.10 9 Although this decision was in accord
with federal precedent, 110 the Alaska Supreme Court's conclusory dis-
posal of the issue indicates an apparent lack of interest in indepen-
dently addressing the problem of police deception of a suspect in order
to obtain a confession.
In Ladd v. State,'1 the Alaska Supreme Court demonstrated a
willingness to construe narrowly the breadth of the Miranda guaran-
tees by taking a restrictive stance on a fifth amendment issue. The
Ladd court stated: "We recognize that courts are not in agreement as
to whether a defendant validly waives his Miranda rights where he
asks to see an attorney but when faced with incriminating evidence or
renewed interrogation by the police makes a confession."',12 Con-
fronting this issue in Ladd, the supreme court rejected a California
rule mandating that any confession elicited in any fashion by the po-
lice after the suspect requests an attorney is inadmissible under Mi-
randa. 113 In deciding to reject such a sweeping rule and instead
"carefully scrutinize the particular facts" of each case, the court de-
clared that the California position "circumscribes too narrowly the
permissible scope of interrogations."' 1 4 When the United States
Supreme Court subsequently addressed the issue in Edwards v. Ari-
zona, 115 however, it felt otherwise, and adopted the more protective
rule that had been promulgated in California. 116
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1007.
110. Id. at 1007 n.4.
111. 568 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978).
112. Id. at 966 n.8.
113. Id. Cases illustrating the California position include People v. Enriquez, 19
Cal. 3d 221, 238, 561 P.2d 261, 272, 137 Cal. Rptr. 171, 182 (1977) ("We conclude
that just as Miranda prohibits continued police interrogation into the substantive
crime after a clear indication that a suspect wants an attorney present, it also prohibits
continued police efforts to extract from a suspect a waiver of his rights to have an
attorney present after a clear indication that the suspect desires such an attorney.");
People v. Randall, I Cal. 3d 948, 958, 464 P.2d 114, 120, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 664
(1970) ("After the initial assertion of the privilege, the defendant is entitled to be free
of police-initiated attempts to interrogate him.").
114. 568 P.2d at 966 n.8.
115. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
116. Id. at 484. In a subsequent case, the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged
that "[t]he high court's holding in Edwards requires us to alter our previously stated
position" articulated in Ladd. Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 221 n.3 (Alaska
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Ladd, like the other cases mentioned above, is far from disposi-
tive on the issue of whether the Moran court's construction of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination will be accepted in
Alaska. These cases do, however, represent instances of the Alaska
court's narrowly construing the Miranda guarantees, and favoring the
interests of the state in the interrogation process. A narrow interpreta-
tion of Miranda and favoring the interests of the state in the interroga-
tion process both played a strong role in the Supreme Court's
upholding of Burbine's waiver.1 17 Thus, these cases do point toward a
possible acceptance of the Moran Court's fifth amendment holding.
B. Case Law Indicating That Alaska Will Likely Reject the Moran
Court's Fifth Amendment Conclusion
A broader look at the Alaska cases that have applied the article I,
section 9, privilege against self-incrimination reveals that the Alaska
Supreme Court has, in fact, favored an expansive reading of that pro-
vision. This expansive reading in turn reveals a stronger concern for
the rights of criminal suspects than demonstrated in Moran. In an
Alaska Law Review article examining in part "the level of immunity
necessary to compel testimony over the invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination," ' 18 the authors concluded that it was "the
1981). The court in Giacomazzi also indicated that if a suspect makes an equivocal
request for counsel, police may seek to clarify the suspect's desires. Id. at 222. In
Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1180 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), this rule was affirmed
despite a split of authority on whether this type of inquiry is appropriate. The court in
Hampel acknowledged that several states hold that regardless of the ambiguity of the
subject's request for counsel, after such a request, all questioning must cease. Id.
After the Supreme Court's ruling in Edwards, Ladd commenced a proceeding for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure 35(c)(1) and
(7); he argued that Edwards should be applied retroactively to his case. Ladd v. State,
664 P.2d 178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). After examining "(a) the purpose to be served
by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on
the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards," the court decided not to apply Edwards retroac-
tively and denied Ladd's petition. Id. at 180-81 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 297 (1967)).
117. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424-28 (1986). See also Note, Decline of
Defense Counsel's "Vital" Role, supra note 5, at 286 (the Court's conclusion in Moran
"was based on the premise that society's interest in utilizing interrogation to secure
confessions outweighs its interest in the protection of individual liberties"); Note,
Waiver of Fifth Amendment Rights, supra note 5, at 421 (the Moran decision "evi-
dences the court's insensitivity to the fundamental protections guaranteed a suspect
through the Miranda decision"); Leading Cases, supra note 5, at 131 ("The court's
narrow construction of the fifth amendment's knowledge requirement for waivers in-
correctly employed a restrictive application of Miranda rather than a broader inquiry
into the deprivation caused by interference with an attorney's access to her client.").
118. Feldman & Ollanik, Compelling Testimony in Alaska: The Coming Rejection
of Use and Derivative Use Immunity, 3 ALASKA L. REV. 229, 242 (1986).
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Alaska Supreme Court's view that the privilege... ought to be inter-
preted broadly."1 19 The article also cites a list of cases that demon-
strate the propensity of the Alaska Supreme Court to interpret the
Alaska Constitution more broadly than the United States Supreme
Court has construed corresponding provisions of the federal Constitu-
tion. °20 This tendency to construe expansively Alaska's privilege
against self-incrimination in order to protect a suspect from prejudice
indicates that Alaska will likely reject the Moran Court's construction
of the fifth amendment and define article I, section 9, to invalidate a
waiver such as Burbine's.
In Scott v. State,12 1 the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted
Alaska's privilege against self-incrimination more broadly than the
United States Supreme Court construed the fifth amendment in Wil-
liams v. Florida,122 which upheld a Florida statute calling for
mandatory disclosure by the defendant of the names and addresses of
his alibi witnesses. The Supreme Court ruled in Williams that the pre-
trial release of such information merely accelerated the timing of its
disclosure and did not implicate the fifth amendment. In Scott, the
Alaska Supreme Court felt that the United States Supreme Court's
timing rationale violated the integrity of the fifth amendment.' 23
Alaska's constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination
forbids extreme pretrial prosecutorial discovery in criminal proceed-
ings, the court concluded. The court also noted that "the fundamental
119. Id. at 255. Cited and discussed by the authors for this proposition are, among
others, McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990, 998 (Alaska 1980) (parolee was subjected
to a revocation hearing followed by a criminal trial; the Alaska Supreme Court, exer-
cising its "inherent supervisory powers" over Alaska courts, held that "where a pa-
rolee is faced with both revocation and a criminal trial based on the same conduct,
upon timely objection any evidence or testimony presented by the parolee at a revoca-
tion hearing is inadmissible by the state in subsequent criminal proceedings."); Surina
v. Buckalew, 629 P.2d 969, 979 (Alaska 1981) (appellant Surina refused to testify for
the state in a robbery trial after the state district attorney and United States District
Attorney promised immunity; the court held that as a matter of state law, "the prose-
cutors in the instant case had the inherent authority, even in the absence of enabling
legislation, to grant immunity and to use that grant to compel testimony which would
otherwise be protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.").
120. Feldman & Ollanik, supra note 118, at 254 n.138. Listed are several cases in
the criminal procedure area noting the stricter standards imposed by the Alaska Con-
stitution on warrantless inspections and investigative stops by police officers. Id. See
Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977) (warrantless administra-
tive inspections); Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976) (investigative stops).
121. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
122. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
123. Scott, 519 P.2d at 783.
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right not to incriminate one's self should apply at every stage of crimi-
nal inquiry or proceedings regardless of judge-made exclusionary or
evidentiary rules."' 124
In support of its departure from Supreme Court fifth amendment
analysis, the Alaska Supreme Court looked to Baker v. City of Fair-
banks. 125 Citing Baker, the court declared that "the appropriate con-
stitutional analysis is not the mere balancing of the state's interests in
facilitating efficient law enforcement with the interest of the citizenry
in maintaining maximum liberty." 126 An individual's rights vested by
the Constitution must be given primacy. Quoted from Baker was lan-
guage stating that any governmental interest in expediency must be of
a compelling nature. 127 "To allow expediency to be the basic princi-
ple," the court stated, "would place the individual's constitutional
right in a secondary position, to be effectuated only if it accorded with
expediency."' 128
Similarly, strong concern for the rights of the individual suspect
during criminal investigations was clearly expressed in Justice Stevens'
dissent in Moran. Stevens declared that the majority's "balancing ap-
proach" that favored society's interest in securing admissions over the
individual's benefit of being informed that an attorney was trying to
reach him was "profoundly misguided." 1 29 "[I]t is the fear that an
individual may exercise his rights [to silence and counsel]," pro-
claimed the dissenters, "that tips the scales of justice for the Court
today."' 130 The similarity in focus between the Moran dissent and
Alaska case law further indicates that Alaska will reject Justice
O'Connor's fifth amendment holding.
The Alaska Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its commitment to
interpreting broadly a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination in
Resek v. State. 13' Although the court held that an in rem forfeiture
proceeding was not a "criminal proceeding" within the purview of ar-
ticle I, section 11, it declared that when such a proceeding precedes a
criminal prosecution, "significant self-incrimination problems
arise."' 132 To illustrate two of those problems, the court looked to an
earlier Alaska case, McCracken v. Corey, 133 which confronted the sim-
ilar problem of holding a parole revocation hearing prior to a criminal
124. Id. at 786.
125. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
126. Scott, 519 P.2d at 784 (citing Baker, 471 P.2d at 394).
127. Id. at 784 n.43.
128. Id. (quoting Baker, 471 P.2d at 394).
129. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 457 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 459.
131. 706 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1985). See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
132. Id. at 293.
133. 612 P.2d 990 (Alaska 1980).
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trial. First, noted the court the state could use the lower standard of
proof present in the revocation hearing to gain evidence for the crimi-
nal trial, thereby alleviating the burden on the prosecution to prove
the defendant's guilt. 134 "Second, forcing a parolee or probationer to
choose between his right to remain silent and his opportunity to be
heard, while possibly not rising to the level of 'compulsion' prohibited
by the fifth amendment, poses an unfair dilemma which 'runs counter
to our historic aversion to cruelty reflected in the privilege against self-
incrimination.' "135
Finding these self-incrimination problems to be even greater in
the context of a forfeiture proceeding than in a parole revocation hear-
ing, the Alaska Supreme Court held that absent exigent circumstances
trial courts should stay such a proceeding until the conclusion of the
criminal trial. Once again, this emphasis on the protection of the sus-
pect's right not to incriminate himself runs counter to the majority's
approach in Moran, which instead stressed the benefit of securing ad-
missions of guilt from the defendant.136
Overriding concern for the rights of a defendant also manifested
itself in Stephan v. State, 137 in which the Alaska Supreme Court went
beyond federal due process requirements and held that custodial inter-
rogations, which were given in a place of detention, including the read-
ing of Miranda rights, must be electronically recorded. 138 Despite the
fact that the court based this ruling solely on the Alaska Constitution's
due process clause, the court also stated that recording was essential to
the adequate protection of the accused's privilege against self-
incrimination. 139
Although the Alaska Supreme Court's interpretations of the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination do not positively delineate how they
would respond to the factual setting presented in Moran, the cases
canvassed above indicate a tendency to construe very broadly the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. In rejecting Burbine's contention that
he should have been told that counsel was trying to reach him, the
Supreme Court focused on society's interest in securing convictions. 140
The Court defended its reading of Miranda by reiterating "[o]ne of
134. Resek 706 P.2d at 293-94.
135. Id. at 294 (quoting McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d at 995).
136. 475 U.S. at 427. See supra note 117.
137. 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
138. Id. at 1162. The police argued this rule would have a "chilling effect on a
suspect's willingness to talk." Id. Given the accused's Miranda right to silence, how-
ever, and the necessity of giving him that warning prior to any custodial interrogation,
the court found the argument not to be persuasive. Id.
139. Id. at 1159-60. The court also stated such recording was necessary to protect
the accused's rights to counsel and a fair trial.
140. Moran, 475 U.S. at 427.
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[its] principle advantages ... is the ease and clarity of its applica-
tion."1 41 As indicated above, the Alaska Supreme Court has instead
focused on the criminal justice system's great interest in guarding the
rights of the accused. "[W]e are not prepared to exchange a funda-
mental constitutional right for expediency," proclaimed the Alaska
Supreme Court in Scott v. State. 142 This emphasis supports the con-
clusion that in interpreting article I, section 9, Alaska courts will reject
Moran and hold that police deception, such as that exhibited by the
Cranston police, vitiates any otherwise knowing and intelligent waiver
on the part of a suspect. Thus, the admission into evidence of a con-
fession such as Burbine's would violate a suspect's privilege against
self-incrimination guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution.
V. ANALYSIS OF MORAN v BURBINE UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE ALASKA CONSTITUTION
Article I, section 7, of the Alaska Constitution mimics the lan-
guage of the due process clauses of the United States Constitution in
providing that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." 143 The interpretation and applica-
tion of the due process clause by the Alaska courts indicate that
behavior such as that of the Cranston police would violate this
provision.
The Moran Court summarily concluded that "on these facts, the
challenged conduct falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so
shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal in-
trusion into the criminal processes of the States."' 144 The Court did
acknowledge, however, that on facts "more egregious than those
presented" in Moran, police deception might rise to the level of a due
process violation. 145 The Moran Court's terse treatment of Burbine's
due process argument contrasts with Alaska's more generous con-
struction of article I, section 7, leading to the conclusion that Justice
O'Connor's reasoning would not be accepted in Alaska.
Criticizing the Court for devoting just "five sentences to its con-
clusion that the police interference in the attorney's representation of
141. Id. at 425 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984)).
142. 519 P.2d 774, 787 (Alaska 1974).
143. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7. The fifth amendment to the United State Consti-
tution provides in relevant part: no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. Similarly, the fourteenth
amendment states in relevant part: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
144. 475 U.S. at 433-34.
145. Id. at 432.
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Burbine did not violate the due process clause," Justice Stevens chal-
lenged the majority's simplistic "shock the conscience" test. 46
Emerging from a more thoughtful consideration of the Supreme
Court's due process clause case law, stated the dissenters, is "the prin-
ciple that due process requires fairness, integrity, and honor in the
operation of the criminal justice system, and in its treatment of the
citizen's cardinal constitutional protections." 147 Justice Stevens con-
cluded, therefore, that "[p]olice interference with communications be-
tween an attorney and his client violates the due process requirement
of fundamental fairness." 148
The Alaska courts' articulations of the requirements of article I,
section 7, more closely resemble the language and approach of the Mo-
ran dissent than the majority opinion. In Shagloak v. State, 149 for ex-
ample, the Alaska Supreme Court broadened the reach of Alaska's
due process clause beyond the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment by holding that a more severe
sentence than was originally imposed on a defendant may not be im-
posed on retrial. The court declared that article I, section 7, demands
a "fundamental standard of procedural fairness."' 150 This language
closely parallels "the requirement of fundamental fairness," articu-
lated by Justice Stevens. 151 In Shagloak, the Alaska Supreme Court
reasoned that exposing a defendant to greater liability on retrial vio-
lated article I, section 7's mandate of procedural fairness as it forced
"a defendant to barter with freedom for the opportunity of exercising
it."152
Stephan v. State1 53 recently reaffirmed the Alaska Supreme
Court's willingness to expand the reach of article I, section 7, beyond
minimum federal due process standards. As previously mentioned,
Stephan demands the electronic recording of custodial interrogation in
146. Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 467. Cited by Justice Stevens for this proposition are, among others,
Wainright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 295 (1986) (a suspect's silence after having
been given his Miranda warnings may not be used against him, as this would violate
the principle that" 'silence will carry no penalty' "), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963) (evidence favorable to the accused and material to his guilt or innocence
may not be suppressed by the prosecution consistent with the due process clause).
148. Moran, 475 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. 597 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1979). The federal rule rejected by the court allowed a
more severe sentence to be imposed at a new trial if such new sentence was based upon
"objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding." Id. at 144 (quoting
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969)).
150. Id. at 145 (citation omitted).
151. 475 U.S. at 466 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. 597 P.2d at 145.
153. 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
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a place of detention. 154 In basing its holding entirely on article I, sec-
tion 7, the supreme court stressed that this requirement was necessary
to protect an accused from "an infringement upon his right to remain
silent and to have counsel present during the interrogation."' 155 The
court also noted that the concept of due process must continually
evolve to keep pace with new technological developments.1 56 By de-
fining article I, section 7, in a fashion similar to the Moran dissent and
expanding the scope of that provision beyond the reach of the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause, both Stephan and Shagloak
indicate that Alaska will not accept the position of the Moran
Court. 15
7
In the 1987 case of Folsom v. State, 158 Chief Judge Bryner of the
Alaska Court of Appeals articulated two standards for police conduct
that would appear to hold the deception of Burbine's attorney viola-
tive of Alaska's due process guarantee. Folsom was arrested after pro-
curing heroin for two undercover police officers posing as users. He
argued that the behavior of these policemen amounted to entrapment
and violated his article I, section 7, right to due process. The court
declared that under Alaska law a test for determining whether the po-
lice's conduct constituted entrapment is "whether the state's conduct
falls below an acceptable standard for the fair and honorable adminis-
tration of ustice."159 Another appropriate inquiry in evaluating an en-
trapment charge is the extent to which "police conduct violates
notions of fundamental fairness and is causally related to the offense
154. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. It is important to note that
this case alone would force a reversal of Moran and hold Burbine's statements in-
admissable. Burbine was interrogated in a place of detention and his confession was
not electronically recorded. See supra Section II.
155. Stephan, 711 P.2d at 1161.
156. Id.
157. The Alaska Constitution's due process clause also provides more generous
protection for defendants than the fourteenth amendment by requiring "the state and
the municipality to take reasonable steps... to preserve [a defendant's] breath sample
• . . or to provide some other alternative check of the breathalyzer results."
Anchorage v. Serrano, 649 P.2d 256, 259 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). Serrano empha-
sized that the ability of a defendant to "cross-examine these tests is critical to his case
and to the integrity of the criminal justice system." Id. In Best v. Anchorage, 712
P.2d 892, 894 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985), the Alaska Court of Appeals stood by its deci-
sion in Serrano despite an intervening United State Supreme Court opinion holding
that the fourteenth amendment does not require the preservation of breath samples.
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). The Supreme Court concluded that
such evidence did not meet the test of constitutional materiality. Id. at 488-89.
158. 734 P.2d 1015 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).




by the accused."' 160 Although the court held that Folsom was not en-
trapped, it concluded that aside from the causality inquiry, these en-
trapment standards also serve as proper tests for whether a due
process violation occurred. 61 Thus, for an Alaska court deciding a
Moran-type case, a proper inquiry would be whether the behavior of
the police meets these requirements. It appears beyond question that
purposeful deception of a suspect's attorney both "falls below an ac-
ceptable standard for the fair and honorable administration of jus-
tice"' 162 and "violates notions of fundamental fairness."' 163
Although none of the above cases directly addresses the factual
scenario presented in Moran, their articulation of what standards po-
lice conduct must meet in order to satisfy the due process requirement
of article I, section 7, goes beyond the relatively weak "shock the con-
science" test employed by the Moran Court.' 64 Language such as
"fair and honorable administration of justice"' 65 invites a certain de-
gree of judicial subjectivity, and thus it is never completely clear what
sort of police deception is constitutionally tolerable and what is not.
The Alaska Supreme Court, however, with its willingness to go be-
yond federal due process standards in order to protect the interests of
the accused, probably would not sanction the deceitful conduct of the
Cranston police.' 66
VI. CONCLUSION
This note has concluded that the courts of Alaska would not up-
hold a Miranda waiver such as Burbine's in the face of similar police
deception. Although article I, section 11, of the Alaska Constitution
is unlikely to be stretched to protect defendants such as Burbine, the
admission of a Moran-type defendant's confession would be found by
the courts of Alaska to be violative of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation guaranteed by article I, section 9, and right to due process of
law guaranteed by article I, section 7. Given the Alaska Supreme
Court's willingness to afford greater protection to criminal suspects by
160. Id. at 1018 (emphasis added).
161. Id. Thus, the court also concluded that "our finding that the challenged po-
lice conduct did not amount to entrapment is a fortiori dispositive of Folsom's sepa-
rate due process argument." Id.
162. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
164. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 466 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
166. Finally, it is important to note that a barrier to the United States Supreme
Court's finding a fourteenth amendment due process violation in Moran was its un-
willingness to "intru[de] into the criminal process of the States." 475 U.S. at 434.
Obviously, there would be no such constraint on an Alaska court assessing whether
similar police conduct violated article I, section 7.
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interpreting the Alaska Constitution more broadly than the United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal Constitution, it ap-
pears unlikely that the court would tolerate the police deception exhib-
ited in Moran.
Should a Moran-type case arise in Alaska the state would cer-
tainly argue that Eben v. State prevents an extension of Alaska's arti-
cle I, section 11, right to counsel to protect the defendant. Regarding
an alleged violation of the defendant's privilege argument against self-
incrimination, the state would note the case law described in Section
IV of this note that narrowly construed the Miranda guarantees. In
addition, the state would have to rely on the policy arguments set
forth by Justice O'Connor in Moran, the principal argument concern-
ing the detrimental effect a rule requiring police to inform suspects
that an attorney was attempting to contact them would have on Mi-
randa. Finally, the state would be forced to counter a defendant's due
process claim by stressing the Moran reasoning.
In contrast, a Moran-type defendant in Alaska would clearly
stress his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to due pro-
cess. He would argue that the Alaska Supreme Court's construction
of each constitutional provision has afforded criminal defendants sub-
stantially broader rights than the corresponding federal guarantee. He
would also argue that the Alaska cases interpreting article I, sections 7
and 9, have stressed the importance of safeguarding the rights of a
criminal defendant, not the strengthening of the state's interrogation
arsenal.
Interestingly, Justice Stevens implicitly recognized that it is not
completely clear what position Alaska would take in a Moran-type
case, as his list of "the many carefully reasoned state decisions that
have come to precisely the opposite conclusion" 167 of the Moran Court
did not include any reference to Alaska. Also significant is the fact
that since Moran was decided, three states have rejected its reasoning
and conclusions.' 68 In a 1987 per curiam opinion, the Florida
Supreme Court found the reasoning of Justice Stevens' dissent pursua-
sive in a case that presented a similar police deception scenario. 169
The court held that the conduct of the police violated the due process
clause of the Florida Constitution. More recently, the Connecticut
Supreme Court also rejected Moran by holding that the due process
clause of the Connecticut Constitution requires that a suspect be in-
formed of an attorney's timely effort to provide counsel. 170
167. 475 U.S. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. One state has also expressly adopted Moran. See supra note 6.
169. Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987).
170. State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, - A.2d - (1988).
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In 1986, the Supreme Court of California also explicitly rejected
Moran, proclaiming that "[flor purposes of the California Constitu-
tion, we adhere in general to the reasoning adopted by the Moran dis-
sent, the American Bar Association, and the overwhelming majority
of state courts which have addressed the issue."' 171 Justice Grodin also
could have added the overwhelming majority of commentators to this
list of Moran detractors.17 2  One writer, in criticizing the Moran
Court's conclusions, noted a passage from Macaulay's The History of
England,: "the guilty are almost always the first to suffer those hard-
ships which are afterwards used as precedents against the
innocent."1 73
Justice O'Connor recognized that some states might disagree with
the Court's conclusions, as she proclaimed "[n]othing we say today
disables the states from adopting different requirements for the con-
duct of its employees and officials as a matter of state law."' 174 The
tenor and holdings of the pertinent Alaska cases indicate that the
Alaska courts will likely act on this invitation and interpret the Alaska
Constitution to invalidate waivers such as Burbine's.
Michael L. Flynn
171. People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 610, 724 P.2d 1166, 1174, 230 Cal. Rptr.
141, 149 (1986). More specifically, the court concluded "[s]uch conduct constitutes a
violation of a California suspect's Miranda rights to counsel, and his independent
right to assistance of counsel .... ." Id. at 610, 724 P.2d at 1175, 230 Cal. Rptr. at
149.
172. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
173. See Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 135 (quoting 1 T. MACAULAY, THE His-
TORY OF ENGLAND 482 (1968)). See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 437 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Moran, 475 U.S. at 428.
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